

The RCD Handbook

BEAM*AInstallation* Guide to the
Selection and Application of
Residual Current Devices

BEAMAInstallation RCD Handbook

Acknowledgements

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1 OVERVIEW

Residual Current Devices

The use of electricity is so much a part of every day life that it is often taken for granted and the risks associated with its use at home and at work are underestimated or misunderstood.

In a typical year, 19 people die from electric shock in the home and a similar number die in other buildings. Fire brigades are called to 10,000 incidents attributed to electrical faults, of which half are in the home. These domestic fires result in about 600 serious injuries and 23 deaths.

Residual Current Devices (RCDs) are electrical devices which afford the highest degree of protection against the risks of electrocution and fire caused by earth faults. However, they are not a panacea for all installation problems; it is therefore important to understand what they can and cannot do. Furthermore the different types of RCD available on the market can be confusing.

This publication has been produced by BEAMA/Installation Members for use by specifiers, installers and end users, to give clear guidance on the selection and application of the wide range of RCDs now available. Guidance is also given on the installation and maintenance of RCDs, including many of the installation conditions that cause 'unwanted tripping'. A number of case studies have been included to demonstrate the benefits of fitting RCDs and the possible consequences of failing to do so.

Most chapters begin with a section that is designed for the non-specialist or end-user. These, and other sections for the end-user, are picked out in blue type.

When read in conjunction with BS 7671 Requirements for Electrical Installations (The IEE Wiring Regulations Sixteenth Edition), the guidance in this publication will contribute to safe and reliable installations.

There can be no doubt that RCDs give protection against electrocution and can reduce the risk of fire arising from insulation failure in the electrical installation. This level of protection can never be equalled by circuit-breakers or fuses alone. The effect on safety, measured by fewer electrocutions and fewer fires, means that RCDs are not only here to stay but their use is likely to increase greatly.

1.1 For the Non-Specialist

Readers who are familiar with the role and operation of RCDs can skip this section and move on to section 1.2

"What is an RCD?"

An RCD is a device that is designed to provide protection against electrocution or electrical fires by cutting off the flow of electricity automatically, or actuating an alarm, when it senses a 'leakage' of electric current from a circuit.


To appreciate the importance of an RCD it is helpful to understand how much electrical energy it takes to kill a human being. The smallest fuse used in a normal electric plug is 3 Amps; it takes less than one twentieth of that current to kill an adult in less than one tenth of a second.

RCD Operation

The operation of an RCD can be understood by taking an analogy from the water flowing in a central heating system.

A leak may occur when the pipework is damaged or punctured. In the same way a 'leak', of electricity can occur when the cable insulation in a circuit is faulty or damaged.

In a central heating system the 'flow' pipe takes the water from the boiler to the radiators; if the installation is sound the same amount of water will return to the boiler. However, if there is a leak, there will be less water in the return pipe than in the flow pipe. If the system had flow detectors in the flow and return pipes, these could be coupled to a valve so that the valve closed when the rate of flow in the return pipe was less than that in the flow pipe.



The rate of flow of water can be compared with the current in an electrical circuit and the water pressure can be compared with the voltage. When the line and neutral currents are equal, the RCD will not trip but when it senses that the neutral current is less than the line current it will trip.

In both cases the leakage is detected without actually measuring the leak itself. It is the flow and return rates that are measured and compared. An RCD compares the line and neutral currents and switches off the electricity supply when they are no longer equal.

With an RCD the line (brown) and neutral (blue) conductors pass through the core of a sensitive current transformer, see Figure 3, the output of which is electrically connected to a tripping system. In a healthy installation the current flows through the line conductor and returns through the neutral conductor and since these are equal and opposite the core remains balanced. However, when a leakage of electric current occurs, see Figure 4, the line and neutral currents are no longer equal; this results in an output from the transformer which is used to trip the RCD and disconnect the supply.

Figure 1. Healthy central heating circuit. The same amount of water flows in the 'flow' and 'return' pipes.

Figure 2. If there is a leak, there will be less water flowing in the 'return' pipe than in the 'flow' pipe. This could be used to trip a valve.

Figure 3. In an RCD, the line and neutral conductors of a circuit pass through a sensitive current transformer. If the line and neutral currents are equal and opposite, the core remains balanced.

Figure 4. If there is an earth fault the neutral current will be lower than the line current. This imbalance produces an output from the current transformer which is used to trip the RCD and so break the circuit.

Figure 3






Figure 4



I.2 Principle of RCD Operation

Figure 5. Schematic of an RCD.



The basic principle of operation of the RCD is shown in Figure 5. When the load is connected to the supply through the RCD, the line and neutral conductors are connected through primary windings on a toroidal transformer. In this arrangement the secondary winding is used as a sensing coil and is electrically connected to a sensitive relay or solid state switching device, the operation of which triggers the tripping mechanism. When the line and neutral currents are balanced, as in a healthy circuit, they produce equal and opposite magnetic fluxes in the transformer core with the result that there is no current generated in the sensing coil. (For this reason the transformer is also known as a 'core balance transformer').

When the line and neutral currents are not balanced they create an out-of-balance flux. This will induce a current in the secondary winding which is used to operate the tripping mechanism.

It is important to note that both the line and neutral conductors pass through the toroid. A common cause of unwanted tripping is failure to connect the neutral through the RCD.

RCDs work equally well on single phase, three phase or three phase and neutral circuits, but when the neutral is distributed it is essential that it passes through the toroid.

Test Circuit

A test circuit is always incorporated in the RCD. Operation of the test button connects a resistive load between the line conductor on the load side of the RCD and the supply neutral.

The test circuit is designed to pass a current in excess of the tripping current of the RCD to simulate an out-of-balance condition. Operation of the test button checks the electromechanical integrity of the RCD only. It is important to note, therefore, that the test circuit does not check the circuit protective conductor or the condition of the earth electrode.

On all RCDs a label instructs the user to check the function of the RCD at regular intervals and to observe that the RCD trips instantly.

I.3 Types of Residual Current Device

RCCB - Residual Current Operated Circuit-Breaker without Integral Overcurrent Protection.

A mechanical switching device designed to make, carry and break currents under normal service conditions and to cause the opening of the contacts when the residual current attains a given value under specified conditions. It is not designed to give protection against overloads and/or short circuits and must always be used in conjunction with an overcurrent protective device such as a fuse or circuit-breaker.

RCBO - Residual Current Operated Circuit-Breaker with Integral Overcurrent Protection

A mechanical switching device designed to make, carry and break currents under normal service conditions and to cause the opening of the contacts when the residual current attains a given value under specified conditions. In addition it is designed to give protection against overloads and/or short circuits and can be used independently of any other overcurrent protective device within its rated short circuit capacity.

SRCD - Socket-Outlet Incorporating a Residual Current Device.

A socket-outlet, for fixed installations, incorporating an integral sensing circuit that will automatically cause the switching contacts in the main circuit to open at a predetermined value of residual current.

PRCD - Portable Residual Current Device.

A device comprising a plug, a residual current device and one or more socket outlets (or a provision for connection). It may incorporate overcurrent protection.

CBR - Circuit-Breaker Incorporating Residual Current Protection.

A circuit-breaker providing overcurrent protection and incorporating residual current protection either integrally (an Integral CBR) or by combination with a residual current unit which may be factory or field fitted.

Note: The RCBO and CBR have the same application, both providing overcurrent and residual current protection. In general, the term RCBO is applied to the smaller devices whereas CBR is used for devices throughout the current range, with ratings up to several thousand amperes, single- and multi-phase. The RCBO and CBR are more strictly defined by the relevant standards.

RCM - Residual Current Monitor.

A device designed to monitor electrical installations or circuits for the presence of unbalanced earth fault currents. It does not incorporate any tripping device or overcurrent protection.

MRCD - Modular Residual Current Device.

An independently mounted device incorporating residual current protection, without overcurrent protection, and capable of giving a signal to trip an associated switching device.

2

EFFECTS OF ELECTRICITY

2.1 Risk of Electrocution

It only requires a very small continuous electric current — 40mA (a twenty-fifth of an amp) or more — flowing through the human body to cause irreversible damage to the normal cardiac cycle (‘ventricular fibrillation’) or death (‘electrocution’). When somebody comes into direct contact with mains voltage and earth, the current flowing from one hand to the other, through the central body area, is of the order 230mA (just under a quarter of an amp).

Appropriate protection against serious injury or death calls for disconnection in a fraction of a second (40ms or one twenty-fifth of a second) at 230mA. For lower values of shock current, longer disconnection times may be acceptable but if disconnection takes place within 40ms fibrillation is unlikely to occur.

‘High sensitivity’ RCDs, rated 30mA or even 10mA, are designed to disconnect the supply within 40ms at 150mA and within 300ms at rated tripping current to protect the user. ‘Medium sensitivity’ devices, rated 100mA or more will provide protection against fire risks but will not provide full personal protection.

A fuse or circuit-breaker alone will not provide protection against these effects.

The actual nature, and effect of an electric shock will depend on many factors — the age and sex of the victim, which parts of the body are in contact, whether there are other resistive elements in the ‘circuit’, for example clothing or footwear, if either of the contact points is damp or immersed in water etc.

It should be born in mind that even with a 10mA or 30mA RCD fitted, a person coming into contact with mains voltage may still suffer a very unpleasant electric shock but such a shock will not cause serious injury or fibrillation. However it may result in other forms of injury if, for example, the victim drops a dangerous tool or falls from a ladder.

2.2 Types of Electrocution Risk

There are basically two different types of electrocution risk.

The first type of electrocution risk occurs if insulation, such as the non-metallic covering around cables and leads, is accidentally damaged, exposing live conductors. If a person comes into contact with the ‘live’ and ‘earth’ conductors there is a more serious risk because the current flowing to earth will be insufficient to operate the fuse or circuit-breaker. This is because the human body is a poor conductor of electricity. Consequently fuses or circuit-breakers provide NO PROTECTION at all against contact with live conductors.

If an RCD is installed, in this situation the current leaking to earth through the body would cause an imbalance as described in Section 1.2 and the RCD would trip. Whilst not preventing an electric shock, the speed of operation of the RCD will minimise the risk of electrocution.

The second risk occurs when the metal enclosure of electrical equipment or any metal fixture such as a sink or plumbing system accidentally comes into contact with a live conductor, causing the metalwork to become live. In the UK, a fuse or a circuit-breaker normally provides protection against this risk because all exposed metalwork is connected to earth. In a correctly designed installation, the current flowing to earth will be sufficient to blow the fuse or trip the circuit-breaker.

2.3 Effects of Electric Shock on the Human Body

Residual current devices with a tripping current of 30mA or less are now widely used in all types of electrical installation and provide valuable additional protection against the risk of electrocution. To appreciate fully the correct application of these important safety devices it is necessary to have some understanding of the physiological effects of electric shock on the human body.

The term ‘electric shock’ is defined in BS 7671 as ‘A dangerous physiological effect resulting from the passing of an electric current through a human body or livestock.’ The amount of current flowing will determine the severity of the shock. Although the definition includes the effects on livestock, this is a rather special area and for the purposes of this section only the effects on the human body will be considered.

The amount of current flowing through the body under normal 50Hz conditions will, in practice, depend on the impedance (the effective resistance of the body to the passage of electric current) of that person, including clothing/gloves/footwear etc., and on the shock voltage. The majority of accidents involve simultaneous direct contact with live parts and earthed metal, so it can be assumed that the shock voltage will be at full mains voltage. The value of body impedance is much more difficult to assess because it can vary enormously according to the circumstances, the characteristics of the individual concerned and also the current path through the body. In most situations the current path will be from hand to hand whilst very occasionally it may be from hand to foot or some other part of the body. This is less common due to the wearing of shoes, socks and other clothing.

In order to understand the wide variations in body impedances that can occur, the human body can be viewed as a flexible container filled with electrolyte, where the internal impedance is reasonably constant at approximately 1000 ohms. The wider variations come from the relatively high resistance at the two contact points on the outside of the container (skin resistance). These, external impedances, can be as high as several thousand ohms depending on the state of the skin (wet or dry), contact area and contact pressure. Initial current flow can be quite low but will start to increase rapidly as even small currents will quickly burn through the surface of the skin resulting in a significant drop in the external impedance. In the worst case scenario, a person receiving a hand-to-hand shock at 230V 50Hz will experience a maximum current flow of 230mA through the central body area. This will have dangerous physiological results, including electrocution.

Effects of different values of electric current flowing through the human body (at 50Hz)

0 - 0.5mA

This current is below the level of perception, usually resulting in no reaction.

0.5mA - 5mA

Although there are no dangerous physiological effects, a current of this order may startle a person sufficiently to result in secondary injury due to falling, dropping items etc.

5mA - 10mA

This produces the same effect as above but, in addition, muscular reaction may cause inability to let go of equipment. In general the female body is more susceptible to this condition than the male. Once current flow ceases, the victim can let go.

10mA - 40mA

Severe pain and shock are experienced as current increases. At currents over 20mA the victim may experience breathing difficulties with asphyxia if current flow is uninterrupted. Reversible disturbance to heart rhythm and even cardiac arrest are possible at higher values of current and time.


40mA - 250mA

Severe shock and possibility of non-reversible disturbances to the normal cardiac cycle, referred to as “ventricular fibrillation”, occur at this level. The possibility of fibrillation increases as current and time increase. It is also possible to experience heavy burns or cardiac arrest at higher currents.

The effects of electric current passing through the human body become progressively more severe as the current increases. Although individuals vary significantly the following list is a good general guide for alternating currents.

It can be seen from the above descriptions that the effect of current passing through the human body is very variable but it is generally accepted that electrocution at normal mains voltage is usually the result of ventricular fibrillation. This condition is triggered by the passage of electric current through the region of the heart and is normally irreversible, unless expert medical attention is obtained almost immediately. The onset of fibrillation is dependent on the magnitude and duration of the current and the point in the normal cardiac cycle at which the shock occurs. For those wishing to study the subject in greater detail this relationship is documented in the international publication IEC 60479:Effects of electric current on human beings and livestock.

Figure 6.
Time/current zones of
effect of a.c. currents
15 Hz to 100 Hz



Zone	Limits	Physiological effects
1	Up to line A	Usually no reaction
2	Line A up to line B	Usually no physiological effects
3	Line B up to curve C ₁	Usually no organic damage to be expected. Likelihood of muscular contractions and difficulty in breathing, reversible disturbances of formation and conduction of impulses in the heart, including atrial fibrillation and transient cardiac arrest without ventricular fibrillation increasing with magnitude and time.
4	Above curve C ₁ C ₁ – C ₂ C ₂ – C ₃ Beyond curve C ₃	Increasing with magnitude and time, dangerous pathophysiological effects such as cardiac arrest, breathing arrest and severe burns may occur in addition to the effects of Zone 3: Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 5%. Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 50%. Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 50%.

Figure 6, which is based on IEC 60479, shows the effect of different values of a.c. current (between 15Hz and 100Hz) and the time for which it is experienced. From these curves it can be seen that at the maximum shock current of 230mA, protection against fibrillation can only be realised if the victim is disconnected from the supply within 40ms (Curve B). At lower values of shock current, progressively longer times are allowed until the danger of fibrillation no longer exists (less than 40mA, Curve C₁).

The tripping characteristics of residual current devices of 30mA or less are designed to

operate within these parameters at 150mA. In this way the victim will always be disconnected from the supply before ventricular fibrillation occurs. It is important to realise that the RCD will not prevent that person from experiencing an electric shock but will generally prevent that shock from being fatal.

The details so far have been greatly simplified by assuming that normal environmental conditions apply and that the source of the electric shock is an alternating current supply at 50Hz. Under special conditions, for example when a body is immersed in water or in close contact with earthed metal, the body impedance will generally be at its lowest, with consequently high shock currents.


Frequencies of 15-100Hz are considered to present the most serious risk. At other frequencies, including direct current, the threshold of fibrillation occurs at a different current level. All these factors must be considered when making a choice of RCD for special applications. **Under these circumstances, the potential user is strongly recommended to consult the manufacturer for appropriate advice.**

3 ELECTRIC SHOCK PROTECTION

3.1 Principles of Shock Protection

Protection of persons and livestock against electric shock is a fundamental principle in the design of electrical installations in accordance with BS 7671: Requirements for Electrical Installations, commonly known as The IEE Wiring Regulations 16th Edition. Use of the correct earthing system is an essential part of this process.

Electric shock may arise from 'direct contact' with live parts, for example when a person touches a live conductor that has become exposed as a result of damage to the insulation of an electric cable. Alternatively it may arise from 'indirect contact' if, for example, a fault results in the exposed metalwork of an electrical appliance, or even other metalwork such as a sink or plumbing system becoming live. In either case there is a risk of an electric current flowing to earth through the body of any person who touches the live conductor or live metalwork. (See Figure 7).



Fuses and circuit-breakers provide the first line of defence against indirect contact electric shock. If the installation is correctly earthed (i.e. all the exposed metalwork is connected together and to the main earth terminal of the installation) then an indirect contact fault will cause a very high current to flow to earth through the exposed metalwork. This will be sufficient to 'blow' the fuse or trip the circuit-breaker, disconnecting that part of the installation within the time specified in BS 7671 and so protecting the user.

Fuses and circuit-breakers cannot provide protection against the very small electric currents flowing to earth through the body as a result of direct contact. Residual current devices, provided they have been selected correctly, can afford this protection as described in the previous chapter. They also provide protection against indirect contact under certain installation conditions where fuses and circuit-breakers cannot achieve the desired effect, for example where the earthing systems described above are ineffective.

3.2 Earthing Systems

For a full understanding of electric shock protection it is necessary to consider the different types of earthing system in use. BS 7671 lists five types as described below:




Figure 8.
TN-C System
In this arrangement a single protective earth and neutral (PEN) conductor is used for both the neutral and protective functions, all exposed conductive parts being connected to the PEN conductor. It should be noted that in this system an RCD is not permitted.




Figure 9.
TN-S System
With this system the conductors for neutral and protective earth (PE) circuits are separate and all exposed conductive parts are connected to the PE conductor. This system is the one most commonly used in the UK, although greater use is being made of the TN-C-S arrangement due to the difficulties of obtaining a good substation earth.




Figure 10.
TN-C-S System
The usual form of a TN-C-S system is where the supply is TN-C and the arrangement of the conductors in the installation is TN-S. This system is often described as a protective multiple earthing (PME) system. This is incorrect since PME is the type of supply.





Figure 11.
TT System
In a TT system the electricity supply provider and the consumer must both provide earth electrodes at appropriate locations, the two being electrically separate. All exposed conductive parts of the installation are connected to the consumer's earth electrode.

Figure 12
IT System
Unlike the previous systems, the IT system is not permitted, except under special licence, for the low voltage supply in the UK. It does not rely on earthing for safety, until after the occurrence of a first fault, as the supply side is either completely isolated from earth or is earthed through a high impedance.



3.3 Protection Against Direct and Indirect Contact

It is a fundamental requirement of BS 7671 that all persons and livestock are protected against electric shock in any electrical installation. This is subject to the installation being used with reasonable care and having regard to the purpose for which it was intended. When considering protection against electric shock, it is necessary to understand the difference between 'direct contact' and 'indirect contact', which was first introduced by the 15th Edition of the IEE Wiring Regulations in 1981 (See Figure 7).

Direct contact electric shock is the result of simultaneous contact by persons or livestock with normally live parts and earth potential. As a result the victim will experience nearly full mains voltage across those parts of the body which are between the points of contact.

Indirect contact electric shock results from contact with exposed conductive parts made live by a fault condition and simultaneous contact with earth potential. This is usually at a lower voltage.

Protection against **direct contact electric shock** is based on normal common sense measures such as insulation of live parts, use of barriers or enclosures, protection by obstacles or protection by placing live parts out of reach. As a result, under normal conditions it is not possible to touch the live parts of the installation or equipment inadvertently.

Protection against **indirect contact electric shock** is slightly more complicated and a number of options are given in BS 7671 for the installation designer to consider. Regulation 413-01-01 lists five different options. The majority of these require specialist knowledge or supervision to be applied effectively. The only practical method for general use is 'Protection by earthed equipotential bonding and automatic disconnection of supply' (EEBADS). This is accepted as the norm for virtually all installations.

EEBADS provides very effective protection against indirect contact electric shock when properly applied. It requires consideration of two separate measures by the circuit designer. These are:

- Earthed equipotential bonding.
- Automatic disconnection of the supply.

Earthed equipotential bonding involves all exposed conductive parts of electrical equipment and other extraneous conducting metalwork being electrically connected ('bonded') together and directly connected to the main earth terminal of the installation. This means that if a fault voltage appears on the metal casing of a particular piece of equipment, this same voltage will be present on all other surrounding metalwork. Theoretically, a person or animal coming into simultaneous contact with the faulty equipment and other earthed metalwork will not experience an electric shock because of the equipotential cage formed by the bonding. In practice, however, a small voltage difference will be present due to circuit impedance; this is referred to as 'touch voltage'. Equipotential bonding, thus, cannot eliminate the shock risk entirely but will reduce the risk of a fatal electric shock to a very small and insignificant possibility.

Automatic disconnection of supply is just as important for proper protection against indirect contact shock. It involves ensuring that the faulty circuit is disconnected within a specified safe time after a fault to earth has developed. What constitutes a safe time depends on many factors and those who require detailed information on this should consult the definitive document, IEC Publication 60479. For general purposes BS 7671 gives maximum safe values of 0.4 seconds for circuits supplying portable equipment and 5 seconds for circuits supplying stationary equipment alone.

In order to meet the requirements for automatic disconnection, it is necessary to ensure that normal overcurrent protection devices, such as fuses or circuit-breakers, can operate quickly enough in the event of an earth fault. This is achieved by making sure that the earth loop impedance is low enough to allow sufficient fault current to flow. It is possible to calculate the appropriate values by referring to the published time/current curves of the relevant overcurrent device but in order to simplify the process BS 7671 publishes maximum values of earth loop impedance (Z_s) for different types and rating of overcurrent device. Reference should be made to BS 7671 Regulation 413-02-08 and to the time/current curves published by the manufacturer.

3.4 RCDs and Indirect Contact Shock Protection

Indirect contact protection by fuses or circuit-breakers is dependent on the earth loop impedance being within the parameters laid down by BS 7671. Where this cannot be achieved or where there is some doubt about the consistency, then an alternative method is required. It is in this situation that the residual current device can offer distinct advantages over conventional overcurrent protection for indirect contact shock protection.

The basis of RCD protection in this situation is to ensure that any voltage, due to earth fault currents, that exceeds 50V is immediately disconnected. This is achieved by choosing an appropriate residual current rating and calculating the maximum earth loop impedance that would allow a fault voltage of 50V. This is calculated by using a simple formula given in BS 7671 Regulation 413-02-16.

$$Z_s \times I_{\Delta n} \leq 50$$

Where

Z_s is the earth fault loop impedance (ohms)

$I_{\Delta n}$ is the rated residual operating current of the RCD (amps)

Maximum values of Z_s for the basic standard ratings of residual current device are given in Table 1, unless the manufacturer declares alternative values.

Table 1.
Maximum values of earth
loop impedance for correct
RCD operation

RCD Rating	Max Value of Z_s (ohms)	
	Normal dry locations	Construction sites, agricultural and horticultural premises
30 mA	1667	833
100 mA	500	250
300 mA	167	83
500 mA	100	50

The use of a suitably rated RCD will theoretically allow much higher values of Z_s than could be expected by using overcurrent protective devices for indirect contact shock protection. In practice, however, values above 200 ohms will require further consideration. This is particularly important in installations relying on local earth electrodes (TT systems) where the relatively high values of Z_s make the use of an RCD absolutely essential.

3.5 RCDs and Direct Contact Shock Protection

In areas of high or uncertain earth loop impedance, a much more significant use of RCDs is to provide ‘supplementary protection’ against direct contact shock. It is this that has led to their widespread use in all types of installation.

Direct contact shock is the result of persons or livestock inadvertently making contact with normally live parts with one part of the body and, at the same time, making contact with earth potential with another part of the body. Under these circumstances, the resulting electric shock will be at full mains potential and the actual current flowing to earth will be of the order 230mA because of the relatively high body impedance involved. It has already been shown in Section 2.3 that currents as low as 40/50mA can result in electrocution under certain circumstances. This is where an RCD with a rated residual operating current ($I_{\Delta n}$) of 30mA or less will detect earth fault currents below those that would present the danger of fibrillation.

The nominal rating of 30mA has thus become the internationally accepted norm for RCDs intended to provide supplementary protection against the risk of electrocution.

However, the rated operating current is not the only consideration; the speed of tripping is also very important. The curves shown in Figure 6 indicate that a maximum tripping time of 40ms is required at fault currents of approximately 230mA if ventricular fibrillation is to be avoided.

Examples of types of fault condition where the RCD can be of particular benefit are illustrated by the case studies in Chapter 5.

One example is situations where basic insulation has failed either through deterioration or, more commonly, through damage. An example of this is when a nail is driven through a partition wall and penetrates a cable. This will cause a first-fault condition due to failure of the basic insulation. The result of this is that there is now a strong possibility that the nail will become live by contacting the live conductor. Any subsequent contact by a person presents a risk of electrocution or injury by direct contact. An RCD will provide supplementary protection and significantly reduce the risk of injury or death because it will

trip when a dangerous level of current flows to earth through the person in contact with the nail.

This type of RCD protection is identical to the more common situation where a flexible cable is damaged (for example by a lawn mower) and exposes live conductors. Here again the RCD provides protection for anybody who comes into contact with the exposed live conductors.

The extra protection provided by RCDs is now fully appreciated and this is recognised in BS 7671 Regulation 412-06-02.

It must be stressed, however, that the RCD should be used as supplementary protection only and not considered as a substitute for the basic means of direct contact shock protection (insulation, enclosure etc.)

3.6 RCDs in Reduced and Extra-Low Voltage Applications

In normal use, dangerous touch voltages should not occur on electrical equipment intended for use with, and supplied from, an extra-low (not exceeding 50V a.c.) or reduced voltage (not exceeding 63.5V to earth in three-phase systems or 55V to earth in single-phase systems) source. Such circuits are known as:

Separated extra-low voltage (SELV), in which the circuit is electrically separated from earth and from other systems.

Protective extra-low voltage (PELV), As SELV except that the circuit is not electrically separated from earth.

Functional extra-low voltage (FELV), an extra-low voltage system in which not all of the protective measures of SELV or PELV have been applied.

Automatic disconnection and reduced low-voltage (ADRLV), a reduced voltage system in which all exposed conductive parts are connected to earth and protection against indirect contact is provided by automatic disconnection by overcurrent protective device or RCD.

SELV, PELV and ADRLV arrangements involve electrical separation of the circuit normally by means of a safety-isolating transformer. In normal use, the transformer prevents the appearance of any dangerous touch voltages on either the electrical equipment or in the circuit. Although extremely rare, a fault occurring within the safety-isolating transformer may result in a dangerous touch voltage, up to the supply voltage, appearing within the circuit or on the electrical equipment. Where supplementary protection against this risk is required, or in the case of ADRLV, an RCD with a rated residual current of 30mA or less, can be installed in the primary circuit to achieve a 5s disconnection time.

In PELV, FELV and ADRLV systems an RCD can, if required, be connected into the secondary circuit of the transformer. This will provide supplementary protection against electric shock under all conditions:

- shock protection if there is a failure of the transformer and mains voltage appears on the secondary side
- protection against indirect contact from the low-voltage secondary voltage
- supplementary protection against direct contact from the low-voltage secondary voltage.

It must be remembered that, since a FELV circuit is not isolated from the mains supply or earth, it presents the greatest risk from electric shock of all of the ELV methods.

An RCD can also provide this supplementary protection in a SELV circuit and its electrical equipment but in this case a double-fault condition, which need not normally be considered, would have to occur before the RCD could operate.

Manufacturer's guidance should always be sought when applying RCDs in extra-low and reduced voltage applications, to confirm that devices will operate at these voltages. This is particularly important with respect to the test button.

4 FIRE PROTECTION

4.1 General

DTI statistics show that fire brigades attend over 10,000 fires every year attributed to faults in electrical appliances, lighting, wiring and accessories. Of these, 5,000 are in the home and result in about 23 deaths annually and 600 casualties requiring medical treatment.

Household electricity supplies are fitted with fuses or circuit-breakers to protect against the effects of 'overcurrents' ('overloads' in circuits which are electrically sound and 'short-circuit faults' due to contact between live conductors in a fault situation.) RCDs provide supplementary protection against the effects of earth-leakage faults which could present a fire risk.

4.2 Protective Measures as a Function of External Influences

It is widely accepted that RCDs can reduce the likelihood of fires associated with earth faults in electrical systems, equipment and components by limiting the magnitude and duration of current flow.

The ability to provide added protection against the risk of fire is recognised in BS 7671, for example;

- Chapter 48 defines the precautions to be taken in 'Installations where Particular Risks of Danger of Fire Exist'. Regulation 482-02-06 requires, in TN and TT systems, that wiring systems, with the exception of mineral insulated cable and busbar trunking systems, are protected against insulation faults to earth by an RCD having a rated tripping current not exceeding 300mA.
- Section 605 defines the particular requirements that apply to 'Agricultural and Horticultural Premises'. Regulation 605-10-01 requires, for the protection against fire, an RCD having a rated tripping current not exceeding 500mA.

Research commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1997, established that a common source of earth faults is surface tracking on insulation. The report confirms that currents as low as 50-100mA have been found to be sufficient to cause ignition and fire as a result of tracking and that at these currents, an RCD rated to provide protection against electric shock, would also have prevented ignition. Attention is drawn also to the fact that minimising the presence of electrically conducting dust or liquids, which may arise due to leakage or spillage, can reduce the onset of surface tracking.

Again, in BS 7671, Chapter 48 sets requirements to prevent the wiring systems and electrical equipment being exposed to the harmful build-up of materials such as dust or fibre likely to present a fire hazard.

For further research information, refer to the extract from the DTI publication *Residual current devices: added value for home safety* in Annex 9.1.

5

CASE STUDIES

5.1 General

It is clear that increased use of correctly selected RCDs, in addition to good wiring practice, can reduce the effects of electric shock and the possibility of fire risk significantly. RCD protection also provides a second level of protection in good installations where the wiring complies with BS 7671 but the integrity of the wiring system has been damaged.

5.2 Typical Risks

5.2.1 Mechanical damage to cables

The risk of people cutting through live cables is well-known. Examples include the following:

Penetration of cable insulation in walls and beneath floorboards. This is a common occurrence in the DIY market. The main danger arises when someone comes into contact with live cables either directly or indirectly, resulting in an electric shock.

Cutting the supply lead or an extension lead with an electric lawn mower or hedge trimmer. This is another common occurrence and can result in either a serious electric shock or death when bodily contact is made with the exposed live conductor.

Trapped or poorly maintained extension leads. The effects here are similar to those described above.

Vermin. It is surprisingly common for mice and other vermin to chew through cables, exposing the live conductors.

In all the above situations, even if bodily contact does not occur, damage to the cable insulation can result in a fire risk.

5.2.2 Bathrooms

Bathrooms present a much higher risk because wet skin, or bodies immersed in water, present a much easier path for an electric current to flow to earth. Consequently BS 7671 goes out of its way to discourage the use of electrical equipment, other than shavers connected through an appropriate shaver supply unit, in bathrooms. Nevertheless, tragedies have occurred as a result of people wrongly using extension cables to supply portable electrical appliances in bathrooms.

5.2.3 Fire risk associated with fixed electrical appliances

Faulty electrical appliances increase the risk of fire. For example, fire can occur when the insulation on an electric motor breaks down due to deterioration or external damage. This can result in the ignition of any flammable material, including dust, in the vicinity of the non-insulated 'live' parts.

5.2.4 Bad wiring practice

Although all new and/or modified installations must comply with the current edition of BS 7671 it is possible that an inexperienced person may subsequently modify an installation.

Examples of the risks of electric shock and fire resulting from incorrectly wired systems include the following: -

- Inadequate earthing or bonding
- Wires trapped during installation
- Insulation damaged during installation
- Bad system design

RCDs are not a substitute for good wiring practice. However, correctly installed RCDs will continue to provide a high degree of protection against the risks of electrocution and fire even when an installation deteriorates due to poor maintenance or lack of compliance with BS 7671.

5.3 Case Histories

The bath

A teenage boy liked playing music cassettes while taking his bath. On a cold winter morning he also connected a portable electric heater to the extension lead in the bathroom.

His father came home to hear the usual loud pop music issuing from the bathroom and thought nothing of it until some time had elapsed and he wanted to use the toilet. When persistent banging on the door and unplugging the extension lead produced no response, he burst open the door to find his son slumped in the bath. All efforts to revive him failed.

A subsequent investigation revealed a fault in the electric heater making the case live. The boy had touched the heater while lying in the bath with a foot on the metal tap, making a direct path for the electric current to flow to earth through his body.

The lawn

On a summer day a husband returned home from work and went into the garden where he expected to find his wife relaxing. To his horror he saw her lying on the lawn beside the electric mower. He was unable to revive her.

By her side was the mower cable with the live conductor exposed. She had cut through this while mowing the lawn to surprise him and save him a job. A pair of scissors still in her hand and some insulation tape starkly indicated that she had attempted to repair the electric lead without switching off the supply. She had somehow grasped the live conductor. Dressed only in a bikini and with no shoes on her feet, her body presented an easy path to earth for the fatal electric current.

The toddler

A two year-old, left playing with his battery-powered toy, was found by his father who initially thought he was asleep. Sticking out of the live and earth of a socket-outlet were two skewers that he had presumably tried to use to power his toy, with tragic consequences.

In the foregoing cases the use of an RCD would have prevented a fatal electric shock. In the following case the use of an RCD did prevent a serious electric shock which could have proved fatal.

The pond

A man arrived home one evening to find the fountain in his garden pond was not working. He was about to plunge his hand into the water to grab the pump and check why it was not working when he remembered that he had installed an RCD. He checked this and found that it had tripped, breaking the supply to the pump. He reset the RCD but it immediately tripped again.

Having made sure the power was off, he removed the pump from the pool and removed the access covers. He could find nothing wrong. He replaced the covers, returned the pump to the pool and reset the RCD. As soon as he switched the supply on the RCD tripped again. Repeating the previous procedure he took the pump apart again. Shaking the main motor body of the pump, he could hear water inside. The seal had broken.

The following case study illustrates how an RCD can provide protection against fire risk.

Water in a ceiling rose

On smelling smoke in a utility room a homeowner fortunately noticed the discoloration of the ceiling rose and the surrounding area of the ceiling and took quick action to isolate the electricity supply. Subsequent investigation showed that a leak had occurred in the flat roof and that rainwater had penetrated into the ceiling void and the ceiling rose. The effect of the dampness had created surface tracking in the ceiling rose which, because of the small fault current, was not detected by the fuse in the consumer unit. In this instance, although not necessary for protection against electric shock, a 100mA RCD would have tripped before burning occurred.

6 RCD SELECTION

This Chapter is designed to help the specifier, installer and end user to decide on the appropriate residual current protection.

Portable residual current devices (PRCDs) are available for use by the non-specialist where normal socket-outlets are not protected by RCDs. They may be high-sensitivity RCD adaptors, which plug into the socket-outlet, or extension units which include a plug, a high-sensitivity RCD and one or more socket-outlets.

Where it is intended to protect the whole or part of the fixed electrical installation by an RCD, the layman is strongly advised to seek expert advice.

Although an essential part of any tradesman's toolkit, the PRCD is not part of the fixed electrical installation and only protects the equipment that is supplied through it.

In practice there may be specific protection issues which are not covered in this handbook. For additional guidance regarding the suitability of a particular RCD for specific applications it is recommended that readers consult the RCD manufacturer.

6.1 RCD Selection Criteria

6.1.1 Sensitivity

For every RCD there is normally a choice of residual current sensitivity (tripping current). This defines the level of protection afforded. Protection is divided into two broad categories:

Personal protection (supplementary protection of persons or livestock against direct contact)

This is ensured when the minimum operating current of the RCD is no greater than 30mA and the RCD operates to disconnect the circuit, within the specified time, in the event of an earth leakage.

Installation protection

This is associated with devices that are used to protect against the risk of fire caused by an electrical fault. RCDs which operate at residual current levels up to and including 500mA provide this type of protection.

6.1.2 Types of RCD

There are seven types of RCD, previously described in more detail in Section 1.3:

1. **RCCB** *Residual current operated circuit-breaker without integral overcurrent protection*
2. **RCBO** *Residual current operated circuit-breaker with integral overcurrent protection*
3. **SRCD** *Socket-outlet incorporating a residual current device*
4. **PRCD** *Portable residual current device*
5. **CBR** *Circuit-breaker incorporating residual current protection*
6. **RCM** *Residual current monitor*
7. **MRCD** *Modular Residual Current Device*

For domestic applications only the first four of the above need to be considered. For industrial and commercial buildings all of the classifications need to be considered.

‘Table 2’ aims to identify where each type of RCD can be used, together with the benefits provided. However, before looking at Table 2 there are two other classifications of RCD that need to be considered – general or time-delayed operation and Type AC, A or B characteristics.

6.1.3 General and Time-delayed RCDs

RCCBs to BS EN 61008:Specification for residual current operated circuit breakers without integral overcurrent protection for household and similar uses (RCCBs) and RCBOs to BS EN 61009: Specification for residual current operated circuit breakers with integral overcurrent protection for household and similar uses (RCBOs) may be defined by the time they take to operate as follows.

General RCDs operate ‘instantaneously’, ie they do not have an intentional delay in operation and thus cannot be guaranteed to ‘discriminate’. This means that where there are two or more general RCDs installed in series in an installation; more than one device may trip in the event of an earth leakage current. This would result in healthy circuits being disconnected even though the initial fault occurred in a different part of the installation. Discrimination is essential in installations where it is important to ensure that a complete system is not ‘shut down’, for example in domestic installations to ensure that lighting and other circuits are not disconnected if an earth leakage occurs in a power circuit.

Time Delayed RCDs provide discrimination in circuits where RCDs are connected in series. It is essential to install devices which incorporate a time delay, upstream of the general device, so that the device nearest a fault will trip. RCDs with built in time delays should not be used to provide personal protection.

For RCCBs complying with BS EN 61008 and RCBOs complying with BS EN 61009 the time delay feature is indicated by the letter ‘S’. For time delay details refer to Section 7.2.1.

6.1.4 Types AC,A and B RCDs.

Residual current devices may also be classified as Type AC, Type A and Type B as follows:

Type AC

Ensures tripping for residual AC currents, whether suddenly applied or slowly rising.

Type A

Ensures tripping for residual AC currents and pulsating DC currents, whether suddenly applied or slowly rising.

Type B

Ensures tripping for residual AC currents, pulsating DC currents and smooth DC currents, whether suddenly applied or slowly rising.

For most applications Type AC devices are the most suitable. For special applications, refer to the manufacturer.

Table 2. Suitability of different types of RCD for different applications

Device type	RCCB						RCBO						SRCD		PRCD		CBR	MRCD	RCM
Earth Leakage Sensitivity mA (2)	10	30	100	300	100 Time Delay	300 Time Delay	10	30	100	300	100 Time Delay	300 Time Delay	10	30	10	30	10mA up to many amps	30mA up to many amps	Zero to many amps
Suitable for domestic applications	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Suitable for industrial & commercial applications	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Earth leakage protection only	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Combined earth leakage & overcurrent protection	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y(1)
Suitable as a main incoming device (CU/DB)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(1)	N
Suitable as a main outgoing device (CU/DB)	Y (1)	Y (1)	Y (1)	Y (1)	Y (1)	Y (1)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y(1)	N
Provides personnel protection	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y(3)	N	N
Provides protection against electrical fire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Protection to socket outlets	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Fixed wiring protection	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Portable appliance protection	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Part of the incomer on Main Switch Board	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Can be used to discriminate with instantaneous downstream device	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y(4)	Y(4)	N

Notes:

- 1) Only if used in conjunction with suitable overcurrent protection (eg: Fuse/circuit-breaker)
2) 10mA RCDs are associated with highly sensitive equipment and high-risk areas such as school laboratories and in hospital areas.
3) Yes, but not normally used.
4) With time delay.

Key:

Y = Yes

N = No

CU = Consumer Unit

DB = Distribution Board

6.2 RCD Selection Guides

The following selection guides are intended to help the specifier or installer decide on the most appropriate solution to common installation arrangements.

6.2.1 Commercial/Industrial Systems

See Figure 13.




Figure 13. Commercial/Industrial System RCD protection options

6.2.2 Sub distribution and final circuit RCD protection options

Figure 14. Outgoing circuit RCD protection, separate from the distribution board.




Figure 15. Whole installation protection.




Figure 16: Split load protection (A)




Figure 17: Split load protection (B)





Figure 18. The best option - individual outgoing protection on all ways



7 OPERATION & MAINTENANCE

7.1 Testing by the End User

All RCDs should be tested at least once a quarter, as required by BS 7671, to ensure that they are still operative. This can be carried out by the end user. It involves operating the test device (normally a pushbutton) marked 'T' or 'Test'. This should cause the RCD to trip, disconnecting the mains supply. Reinstall the supply by reclosing the device or pressing the 'Reset' button as appropriate.

If the RCD does not switch off the supply when the test button is pressed, the user should seek expert advice.

7.2 Testing by the Installer

7.2.1 Time/current performance test

A functional test, independent of the RCD test button facility, is required by BS 7671 to ensure that the RCD is operating within the correct trip times at the appropriate test current. The test parameters detailed in Table 3 are in accordance with the requirements of the relevant product standards – BS EN 61008 Part 1 and BS EN 61009 Part 1.

All tests must be performed with all loads disconnected, making use of an appropriate calibrated test instrument connected as close to the RCD as possible for convenience.

Table 3. Time/current performance criteria

RCD type	Sensitivity(mA)	Test current I _{Δn} (mA)	Trip time (ms)	Test current 5I _{Δn} (mA)	Trip time (ms)
General Non-delay	10	10	300 max.(1)	50	40 max.
	30	30		150	
	100	100		500	
	300	300		1500	
	500	500		2500	
Delay 'S'(2)	100	100	130 min.	500	40 min.
			500 max.		150 max.
	300	300	130 min.	1500	40 min.
			500 max.		150 max.
	500	500	130 min.	2500	40 min.
			500 max.		150 max.

Notes: (1) BS4293 specifies a maximum trip time of 200ms.
(2) BS4293 states that trip times for time delay RCDs are specified by the manufacturer.

7.2.2 Operational test

Upon completion of the functional test an operational check of the RCD should be undertaken by pressing the RCD test button as described above. If the RCD fails to trip, investigate in accordance with the 'Trouble shooting' chart (Figure 19.)

7.2.3 Insulation tests

When insulation tests are carried out on an installation, the applied voltage should not exceed 500V DC (RCDs are designed to withstand this voltage).

7.2.4 Earth loop impedance testing

Most earth loop impedance testers are designed to inject an AC current to earth of about 20A. This is sufficient to trip any RCD. To overcome this problem, earth loop impedance testers are available which use a DC current to desensitise the RCD during the test. This type of tester, however, only works on RCDs that are sensitive to AC faults alone. Type A RCDs (designed to the product standards BS EN 61008 & BS EN 61009) will trip upon detection of the DC desensitising current.


Earth loop impedance figures for installations which contain RCDs sensitive to both AC and DC fault currents (i.e. type ‘A’ devices), should be determined either by calculation or by using a tester having a test current below the device trip threshold. Alternatively, test methods can be used which will not trip the RCD. One such method is to measure the earth fault loop impedance on the supply side of the RCD and add this to the value of the combined resistance (R1+R2) on the load side of the RCD. This method also checks the continuity of the protective conductor, however it can only be used in an ‘all insulated’ installation.

Note (R1+R2) is the sum of the resistances of the phase conductor (R1) and the circuit protective conductor (R2) on the load side of the RCD.

7.3 Troubleshooting

7.3.1 Troubleshooting for the end user

Figure 19. Troubleshooting for the end user



7.3.2 Troubleshooting for the electrical contractor/instructed Person

Typical causes of unwanted tripping:

Line side (Upstream of the RCD)

- Loose connections
- Mains borne disturbance
- Site machinery/plant
- Installed services
- Lightning strike


Load side (Protected ‘down stream’ side of the RCD)

- Wrongly specified RCD
- Loose connections
- Incorrect applications
- Wet plaster / Condensation
- No discrimination between RCDs
- Crossed neutral on split load board
- N – E fault
- High standing earth leakage
- Appliances & installed services
- Mineral insulated conductors
- Heating elements (e.g. cookers)
- Householder / DIY faults (e.g. nails/picture hooks)
- Moisture ingress (appliances, sockets etc)

For assistance in faultfinding, a step-by-step trouble shooting flow chart is given in figure 20.

7.4 Detailed Fault Finding in RCD protected installations

Figure 20. Troubleshooting for the electrical contractor/instructed person



8 RCD CONSTRUCTION

8.1 Voltage Independent RCD

Voltage independent RCDs use the energy of the earth fault current to trip the mechanism directly. In this type of RCD the output from the sensing coil operates a specially constructed magnetic relay and so releases the RCD mechanism, independently of the mains voltage.

Voltage independent RCDs normally use a polarised (field weakening) relay construction. This operates by cancellation of the permanent magnetic flux (which holds the relay ON) by the excitation flux (produced by the fault current). This can only occur in one half-cycle of the AC supply because the magnetic flux will be reinforced in the other half cycle. Operating times can vary from 20 to 120 ms at rated tripping current.




Figure 21. Polarised relay construction

8.2 Voltage Dependent RCD

Voltage dependent RCDs generally employ an electronic amplifier to provide an enhanced signal from the sensing coil to operate a trip solenoid or relay (Figure 22). RCDs of this type are defined as 'voltage dependent' because they rely on a voltage source, derived from the main supply, or an auxiliary supply, to provide power to the amplifier. The basic principle of operation is, however, the same as voltage independent RCDs.




Figure 22. Voltage dependent RCD design

9 DETAILED FAULT-FINDING ON RCD-PROTECTED INSTALLATIONS

An RCD will detect and trip not only on a phase-to-earth fault but also on a neutral-to-earth fault. The majority of earth faults occur in appliances, particularly portable appliances and their flexible cables. This means that in many installations, faults can be located easily by unplugging appliances until the RCD stops tripping. However, it is not uncommon to find a floorboard nail driven between the neutral and earth conductors, reversed neutral and earth connections or a neutral conductor touching an earthed mounting box. It should also be remembered that withdrawing a fuse or tripping a circuit-breaker in a final circuit does not normally interrupt the neutral and may not prevent an RCD from tripping. Such a condition could occur during a partial re-wire where the RCD is already installed. Cutting through a cable could cause the RCD to trip but this may not be noticed at the time. During fault-finding, the trip may not be associated with the cutting of the cable.

The most effective way of testing for earth faults in the wiring or equipment is by measuring the insulation resistance from phase to earth and from neutral to earth (as described in BS 7671 Section 713-04.) It is essential to ensure that the electrical circuit is isolated from the mains. It is also important to ensure that there are no time-switches, connectors etc. isolating any part of the circuit from the test equipment whilst the tests are carried out. Care should also be taken to ensure that there is no equipment that will be damaged by the tests.

Even when equipment cannot be unplugged, a phase-to-earth fault is relatively easy to find since each phase conductor can be isolated by withdrawing the fuses or by tripping each circuit breaker. The faulty sub-circuit can then be identified by replacing each fuse or closing each circuit-breaker in turn until the RCD trips.

In the case of a neutral-to-earth fault, all neutral conductors must first be disconnected from the neutral bar. The faulty sub-circuit can then be identified by connecting each neutral conductor in turn onto the neutral bar until the RCD trips.

The above discussion only applies if the phase-to-earth or neutral-to-earth fault is of low enough impedance to allow sufficient earth fault current to flow to trip the RCD.

It might be assumed that any standing protective conductor current below the trip level of the RCD could be ignored. Unfortunately this is not so because the RCD sensitivity is effectively increased to the difference between the RCD trip current and the standing protective conductor current. For example, an RCD with a rated residual operating current of 30mA will have a typical trip current of 22mA; if the standing protective conductor current is 10mA it will only take an earth fault current of 12mA to trip the RCD. This could lead to unwanted tripping.

It may be possible to obtain an approximate measurement of this standing protective conductor current in domestic, commercial and some light industrial installations simply by connecting a milliammeter into the main earthing conductor. Care must be taken while performing this test since exposed and extraneous metalwork could become live if the main earthing lead is disconnected and a phase-to-earth fault exists. Safety is paramount and the contractor must ensure that the consumer will not come into contact with any exposed and extraneous metalwork while the test is being carried out.

However, this method is unlikely to work where the means of earthing is provided by the electricity supplier and the supply is PME or 'corrupted' TN-S. This is because there are

likely to be diverted neutral currents flowing in the earthing conductor; not only from the installation in question but also from other installations. The true protective conductor current can be measured by a 'clamp-on' milliammeter encircling the phase and neutral main tails of the installation. In this arrangement the instrument 'sees' the same current that an RCD would see at the same point in the installation.

A standing protective conductor current can also cause the test circuit of some RCDs to become inoperative if it is in anti-phase with the test circuit current, thus cancelling part of its effect. This phenomenon depends on whether the supply cables enter at the top or bottom of an RCD and which way round the test circuit is wired. It occurs only rarely and only in RCDs which have a test circuit current very close to the rated tripping current. It in no way affects the ability of an RCD to trip on a true earth fault.

A high-impedance neutral-to-earth fault is the most difficult type of earth fault to locate because the fault current may be insufficient to trip the RCD. From a safety point of view a neutral-to-earth fault with little or no current flow through it does not present a danger. However, when any protected load is switched on, some of the load current will travel through the neutral-to-earth fault; when the load current is large enough the RCD will trip. Because the fault is load-dependent, tripping can appear to be random. Switching on a large load connected to another sub-circuit that is healthy may still trip the RCD. This is because part of the load current may flow to earth through the neutral block and the neutral-to-earth fault. The symptoms of a partial neutral-to-earth fault are very similar to unwanted tripping and are discussed in more detail later.

9.1 Mains-Borne Transients and Surges

Although the overall reliability of RCDs is excellent, in a number of cases conditions can occur within an installation that can cause an RCD to trip when no apparent fault condition can be found. This type of unwanted tripping is often incorrectly referred to as 'spurious' or 'nuisance' tripping and can be a source of considerable frustration for a contractor who attempts to trace this elusive fault. However, once the reasons for unwanted tripping are understood, and it is realised that it is attributable to the installation conditions and not the RCD, then a methodical course of action will overcome the problem with a minimum of effort.

Two main causes of unwanted tripping can be identified:

- Transient surge currents between phases or between phase and neutral within the installation
- A combination of supply network transient overvoltages, and capacitance to earth within the installation

9.1.1. Tripping due to surge currents

In theory, tripping due to surge currents between phases or between phase and neutral should not occur but in practice any magnetic device such as an RCD will have leakage flux. If the load current is large enough, this leakage flux will induce sufficient secondary current to trip the RCD. For example BS EN 61008-1 Clause 9.18 requires that an RCCB should not trip when one-second surges of six-times rated current flow. BS EN 61009-1 requires that RCBOs do not trip when subjected to one-second surges of 0.8 times the lower limit

of the overcurrent instantaneous range according to type B, C or D, as applicable.

Experience in the field has shown that tripping due to surge currents is not the major cause of unwanted tripping.

9.1.2. Tripping due to transient overvoltage and capacitance to earth

A transient overvoltage can be defined as a temporary surge, of limited energy, caused by a sudden change in power requirements. Sources of transient overvoltage include reactors of any type, e.g. motors, transformers, contactors, power-factor correction capacitors etc. They are also caused by arcing at switch, contactor, relay and circuit breaker contacts.

It is known that lightning strikes can be a source of unwanted RCD tripping. K.M.Ward ('Lightning Damped', *Electron*, 23 January 1979) stated: "the initial surge on an 11 kV line, due to a strike, may be of the order of 240kV at the point of impact and will reach a point two miles from the point of origin in 3μs by which time it will have fallen exponentially to some 140kV."

Some of these transient overvoltages could be expected to be transformed down and would appear on the 230V mains. Hence, unwanted tripping can occur some considerable distance (i.e. several kilometres) away from the point of impact of a lightning strike. Ward also states that secondary distribution systems may carry transient overvoltages of up to 3.3kV.

The blowing of a simple rewirable fuse can also cause transients. One of the pioneers of fuse technology, H.W. Baxter (*Electric Fuses*, 1950) stated: "It is noteworthy that, given sufficient inductance, the peak voltage with a 10-inch (copper) fuse wire reached 6000V (approximately 29 times the circuit voltage)."

It has been reported that over-voltages of 6000V can be reached with BS 1363 plug fuses used in inductive circuits. It would not be unreasonable (based on Baxter's research) to get a peak voltage of 2kV from a two-inch copper fuse wire subjected to a prospective fault current of 1.2 kA, or a peak voltage of 1.1 kV from a two-inch copper wire subjected to a prospective fault current of only 400A.

Although significant transients can arise within an installation they will only occur under fault conditions. They might, however, travel to other installations where they could cause unwanted tripping of an RCD.

Discharge lighting can be a major source of transient overvoltages. Discharge lighting is distinct from other equipment in that high-voltage pulses are produced deliberately to initiate the discharge. Because of the inductive nature, and hence lagging power factor of the control circuits of discharge lamps, a capacitor is frequently used for power factor correction. This is connected directly across the supply terminals of each lamp. The characteristics of discharge lamps and their control gear also produce considerable third harmonic current (approximately 20% of phase current.) This is not reduced by the power-factor correction capacitor. As a result, the percentage of third harmonic current is greater in a high power-factor circuit than a low power-factor circuit.

When a discharge lamp is switched on, a surge of many times rated current (i.e. several hundred amps) may occur for several microseconds due to the charging of the power-factor correction capacitor. Alternatively, if no power-factor correction capacitor is included, the opening of the supply switch will cause voltage surges of several kV. Either situation can cause unwanted RCD tripping.

Some types of discharge lighting (e.g. high-pressure sodium lamps and metal halide lamps) use external igniters, which produce a series of high voltage pulses, which cease when the lamp starts. These pulses are of short duration but range from 3kV to 4.5kV for high-pressure sodium lamps. Metal halide lamps are ignited by applying 9kV pulses at 10ms intervals for up to 7 seconds directly on to the lamp. The very large number of discharge lamps in use (particularly for street lighting) makes it likely that this is a major source of transient overvoltages.

From the foregoing it will be seen that unwanted tripping may be caused by transient overvoltages in the mains supply, originating from outside the installation.

The question of how these transient overvoltages trip an RCD has not yet been discussed. Transients can appear in three possible forms:

- Between phase and neutral and of opposite polarity with respect to earth
- Between phase and neutral but of the same polarity with respect to earth
- Either on phase only or on neutral only with respect to earth

Tests on installations, with transient surge suppression connected across phase and neutral, have shown no reduction in the amount of unwanted tripping.

For a transient overvoltage to trip an RCD, it must cause a current imbalance by either:

- Causing a flashover to earth due to breakdown of insulation or
- Allowing sufficient high-frequency earth leakage due to the capacitance to earth.

If the former were happening, then a flashover from a low-energy transient would be followed (at least in some cases) by a mains flashover. No installations investigated so far have shown this type of damage.

The capacitance to earth required to cause a current flow of 50mA can be calculated. Assuming an isolated pulse with a 50μs rise time and a peak voltage of 1kV, say:

$$X_c = \frac{1000}{0.05} = 20000\Omega$$

$$\text{Frequency} = \frac{1}{4 \times 50 \times 10^{-6}} \approx 5000\text{Hz}$$

$$C = \frac{1}{2\pi \times 5000 \times 20000} = 1.6\text{nF}$$

In practice, an isolated transient does not occur. There will be several hundred such pulses and they may well have peak voltages greater than 1kV. The cumulative effect of their fast rise times, coupled with their fast repetition frequency, could produce sufficient earth fault current to trip an RCD if sufficient capacitance to earth exists.

9.2 Capacitance to Earth

The capacitance of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.5mm² flat thermoplastic insulated twin and earth cable is approximately 150pF per metre. It would not be unusual for a domestic installation to have 100m of 2.5mm² cable and 250m of 1.0 or 1.5mm² cable, which would result in a capacitance to earth of up to 52.5nF. This would allow a standing protective conductor current of 11µA/m or a cable leakage current of nearly 4mA for the whole installation (at 230V, 50Hz).

The capacitance to earth of 2.5mm² mineral insulated (MI) cable is higher, approximately 400pF/m. This would allow a standing earth leakage of 30µA/m. A commercial or industrial installation could contain 500m of cable, which could result in a capacitance to earth of up to 200nF. This would allow a standing protective conductor current of nearly 15mA while providing a very low impedance path for any transient overvoltages.

The advantages of mineral-insulated (MI) cable over plastic insulated types are in no way disputed, but the higher capacitance of MI cable can present the contractor with additional earth fault problems. These should be taken into account during the early design stage when MI cable and RCD protection are to be used together.

Another major source of capacitance to earth is radio frequency interference (RFI) suppression components. It is common practice to connect capacitors between live and neutral, live and earth and neutral and earth. These capacitors are usually supplied on a single ‘delta-connected’ unit to BS 613: *Specification for components and filter units for electromagnetic interference suppression*. Maximum allowable values of capacitance to earth are specified in BS 613 and are listed in Table 4.

Table 4.
Maximum Values of
Capacitance which may be
connected from the supply
to exposed metalwork of
Class 1 equipment in BS
613 Filter Components

Applications	(BS 613) LIVE TO EARTH		
	Capacitance (µF)	Leakage (mA) @ 240V, 50Hz	Neutral to Earth Capacitance (µF)
In an appliance connected to mains by a plug and socket	0.005	0.38	0.005
In a non-reversible 3-pin plug	0.005	0.38	0.05
In a permanently earthed household appliance	0.005	0.38	2
In a permanently earthed non-household appliance	0.2	15	2
In permanently earthed 3-phase equipment	0.2	15 per phase	2

RFI suppression units, particularly those allowed in non-household appliances, can cause significant standing protective conductor currents and will provide a path for currents resulting from transient overvoltages.

The large value of neutral-to-earth capacitance, allowed in permanently earthed equipment, would not normally cause a problem. It would become significant if transient overvoltages occurred between neutral and earth. Also, double-pole switching would cause an RCD to trip since up to full mains voltage could suddenly appear across this capacitance during switch-off. (See Section 9.3).

Other British Standards which are relevant to earth leakage or RFI suppression, but which make no reference to maximum allowable earth-leakage currents or capacitance-to-earth, are:

BS EN 60065: *Specification for safety requirements for mains-operated electronic and related apparatus for household and similar general use*

BS 1650: *Capacitors for Power-Frequency Systems*

BS EN 55011: *Limits and methods of measurement of radio disturbance characteristics of industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio-frequency equipment*

BS EN 55013: *Limits and methods of measurement of radio disturbance characteristics of broadcast receivers and associated equipment*

All this means that there are no clear guidelines limiting the amount of capacitance to earth that a manufacturer fits into his equipment. BS EN 60335-1 puts maximum limits on the 50 Hz, 230V protective conductor current for household appliances to 5mA for stationary Class 1 appliances with heaters (e.g. cookers), 3.5 mA for motor-operated Class 1 appliances, 0.75 mA for other Class 1 appliances and 0.25 mA for Class 2 appliances. BS 4533 and BS EN 60598 place limits on the maximum protective conductor currents allowed in luminaires. BS EN 60335-2-90 covers the safety aspects of microwave ovens and specify a maximum protective conductor current of 1mA.

Until 1988 the maximum allowable value of protective conductor current in an installation was given by the *Electricity Supply Regulations, 1937*, and was limited to one ten-thousandth part of the maximum current to be supplied to the installation. The relevant Clause (Clause 26) was referred to in Regulation 13-9 of the 15th Edition of the *IEE Wiring Regulations*. The 1937 Regulations were replaced by the *Electricity Supply Regulations 1988*, since when there has no longer been any limitation on protective conductor current within the regulations for the supply of electricity. Effective from 31st January 2003 the *Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 2002* replaced the *Electricity Supply Regulations*. No requirements are set in the new regulations either and the situation therefore remains unchanged.

An installation is “deemed to comply” with the safety requirements of the regulations for the supply of electricity if it complies with BS 7671 *Regulations for Electrical Installations (the IEE Wiring Regulations)*. So if there is to be a maximum allowable protective conductor current in an installation it should be set by BS 7671.

There are no absolute limits on maximum earth leakage current in BS 7671. Rather than place a maximum limit on protective conductor current, BS 7671 encourages the subdivision of circuits (Regulation 531-02-04) and does not prevent the reduction of RCD sensitivity to cater for high protective conductor currents. However, this can result in a lower degree of protection against electric shock.

To summarise, there is currently no limit on protective conductor current within an installation as a whole either in legislation or BS 7671.

This problem has been addressed internationally in the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee for Electrical Installations, TC 64. IEC Publication 61140: *Protection against electric shock – Common aspects for installations and equipment* is a basic safety standard which covers the broad requirements for protection against electric shock for both equipment and installations. The 2001 Edition of IEC 61140 Annex B (informative) introduced, for the first time, internationally agreed limits for maximum protective conductor currents which could become part of product standards and installation rules. For example, they could provide the basis for future changes to the requirements for protection against electric shock in BS 7671, particularly Chapter 41.

Returning to practical issues. The old practice of protecting a whole distribution board by a single high-sensitivity RCD can, in many cases, lead to unwanted tripping, particularly in industrial environments where inductive loads will cause greater transient overvoltages and where longer cable runs will result in larger values of capacitance to earth. There have been instances of a contractor supplying a 12-way TP and N distribution board, via a 30mA RCD, to control banks of fluorescent fittings and then wondering why the RCD kept tripping out!

Apart from initial current surges on switch-on and possible flashover due to a faulty fitting, an isolated fluorescent fitting by itself does not appear to be a major source of unwanted tripping. Banks of fluorescent fittings used in conjunction with other appliances will, however, result in an accumulation of standing protective conductor current and will present a low impedance path to earth for transient overvoltage currents through the capacitance to earth.

9.3 Double-Pole Switching

Double-pole switching within the fixed wiring is known to produce a strange phenomenon whereby switching OFF a double-pole switch supplied through an RCD can cause the RCD to trip. Single-pole switching does not produce this effect, and it is known that changing over from double-pole to single-pole switching can overcome the problem, where such replacement is permissible and safe.

The phenomenon is explained by the fact that while capacitance between neutral and earth will exist in all installations, the earth leakage through this capacitance will be negligible due to the low (almost zero) potential between neutral and earth. When the neutral pole of a double-pole switch is opened, the voltage across this capacitance will suddenly increase, with a subsequent increase in neutral-to-earth capacitive earth leakage currents. This increase will be at a maximum if the neutral opens first and will be aggravated by arcing at both switch contacts which will cause high frequency voltage spikes to cause even higher neutral-to-earth leakage currents. The effect may be aggravated further by the slow-break feature of the switch often found in domestic a.c. switchgear.

Closing a double-pole switch may also trip an RCD (as may closing a single-pole switch), but in this case any tripping is unlikely to be caused by neutral-to-earth capacitance since the fast-make characteristic of the switch reduces both arcing and the time that any significant voltage might exist between the load-side neutral and earth. Any circuit, which incorporates only single-pole switching, will never experience this type of problem since (under normal operating conditions) the neutral-to-earth voltage is so low that the neutral-

to-earth capacitive earth leakage is negligible.

The problem appears to occur most frequently in installations where a separate consumer unit and RCD are installed. The opening of the consumer unit switch will allow a higher voltage (possibly 230V) to appear suddenly across the neutral-to-earth capacitance of the whole installation. This can result in sufficient earth fault current to trip the RCD.

9.4 Cables and Overhead Lines

There are indications that the problem of unwanted tripping occurs more frequently in installations supplied by overhead lines than by those supplied by underground concentric cable. This can be explained by examining the capacitance and inductance of these two types of conductor as shown in Annex 10.2. The analysis shows that:

- The inductance and capacitance of a steel-armoured cable is significantly greater than that of an equivalent overhead line.
- The inductance of a steel-armoured cable is significantly greater than that of an equivalent non-armoured cable.
- The capacitance of a non-armoured cable is significantly greater than that of an equivalent overhead line.
- The inductance of an overhead line is greater than that of an equivalent non-armoured cable

Table 5 gives typical values of inductance and capacitance for overhead lines and cables obtained from the *Electrical Engineers Reference Book* (Tables II, page 6-19; III and IV, page 6 - 7). They agree with values, which can be derived from other sources;

- *The Calculation and Design of Electrical Apparatus*, W.Wilson, Table VII and VIII, pages 125-6.
- *The Switchgear Handbook*, Vol. 2, pages 2 - 4.

	Overhead Line	Cable
Inductance (mH/mile)	1.8 to 2.1	0.8
Capacitance (µF/mile)	0.015	0.27 to 0.5

Table 5.
Approximate values of inductance and capacitance found in practice.

Another significant fact is that, in general, the characteristic impedance of a cable is very much lower than that of an overhead line. Only a small fraction of any voltage surge that travels down a line would be transmitted down an equivalent cable. For this reason equipment at the end of an overhead power line is sometimes connected to the line by a short length of surge-minimising cable. A cable is, by its very nature, a good attenuator of transient overvoltages.

The distance between the installation and the sub-station will be significant since the amount of attenuation between the installation and the transient overvoltage sources (e.g. sub-station transformers, street-lighting, tap changers etc) will be a function of cable length. Also, an overhead line behaves as a good aerial to radio-frequency signals and noise while an underground cable, by both its nature and location, is less susceptible to this type of interference.

The foregoing analysis indicates that unwanted tripping of an RCD is less likely within installations supplied by underground steel-armoured cables, due to the large inductance and capacitance of the cable, and more likely on installations fed by overhead lines due to the low capacitance of the line. The fact that TN-C-S cables are not generally steel-armoured, suggests that unwanted tripping is more likely on TN-C-S installations than on non-TN-C-S systems.

9.5 Neutral-to-Earth Faults

Although neutral-to-earth faults do not normally fall under the heading of ‘unwanted’ tripping, they can result in intermittent effects within an installation that appear illogical and very similar to unwanted tripping. This is particularly true where the neutral-to-earth fault impedance is significant or where the installation is part of a PME (Protective Multiple Earthing) TN-C-S system. This is aggravated by the fact that it is difficult to electrically isolate parts of the neutral wiring of an installation.

The detection of a neutral-to-earth fault by an RCD depends on either:

- The existence of a neutral potential above earth caused by the voltage drop along the neutral or
- The existence of a load connected into the protected circuit. Part of the load current then flows back via the earth return thus tripping the RCD. This load current will also cause a voltage drop along the neutral

In a non-TN-C-S system, the existence of such a neutral potential above earth is almost inevitable due to all the consumer loads connected to that neutral. In a TN-C-S installation the neutral potential above earth can depend on that one consumer load, due to the TN-C-S link. Therefore, in a TN-C-S installation with no load or a very light connected load, an RCD cannot detect a neutral-to-earth fault. This can also happen in a non-TN-C-S system where all consumers on the same neutral are taking virtually no load or in an installation that happens to be close to the sub-station. In practice these last effects are rare.

Where the neutral-to-earth fault impedance is significant, then the earth leakage current will be insufficient to trip the RCD. The fault may now be described as ‘unwanted tripping’ since the detection of this fault becomes totally load-dependent and the RCD may trip at random times. By itself this condition is not serious since, if no current is flowing, the neutral-to-earth fault is not a danger but as soon as a load is connected, and the earth leakage current reaches a dangerous level, the RCD will trip. The user or installer may be baffled by all these effects and will often describe the fault as spurious or nuisance tripping.

9.6 Double Grounding

‘Double Grounding’ is a phenomenon highlighted by the Americans — hence its name. It is frequently discussed in IEC committees. It occurs when two earth faults — a phase-to-earth fault and a neutral-to-earth fault — occur simultaneously in a circuit protected by an RCD. Where these earth faults do not present large impedances, and therefore the earth fault current is limited, nothing out of the ordinary is likely to happen. However, when the earth fault impedance of both faults is significant, then a situation can occur where the phase-to-earth fault current can cancel the effect of the neutral-to-earth fault current since the two currents flow in opposite directions through the RCD. Furthermore, ‘double

grounding’ can render the RCD test circuit inoperative due to the neutral-to-earth fault current cancelling the effect of the test circuit current.’

‘Double Grounding’ phenomena rarely occur in practice. They virtually never occur on non-TN-C-S systems due to the neutral-to-earth voltage. They have been known on TN-C-S systems but only when the systems were unloaded. Problems have occurred on TN-C-S installations during the commissioning stage where it is common for no load to be connected.

9.7 Conclusions

The contractor can become totally confused by the combination of installation conditions that could lead to random tripping on TN-C-S installations. Often, the RCD is blamed for being “too sensitive”, “unreliable” etc, when it is the installation conditions which are to blame.

Where phase-to-earth and neutral-to-earth faults occur on the same circuit, it is easier to locate the phase-to-earth fault first. Tripping of the circuit breakers or removal of fuses in the sub-circuits can disconnect the live circuits easily. After elimination of the live-to-earth fault, the neutral-to-earth fault will be easier to locate.

In all cases, but especially on TN-C-S Systems, the effect of load current must be borne in mind. A heavy load should be applied to all sub-circuits before assuming that all earth faults have been eliminated.

A flowchart for faultfinding on RCD protected installations, is shown in section 7.4 (Fig. 20). It includes all the possible faults discussed in this Chapter. It provides a logical approach to diagnosing an earth fault and its careful use should allow any earth fault problem to be solved. This chart shows that the effects due to protective conductor currents can be quite complex.

Capacitance to earth is the most significant cause of unwanted tripping and can easily reach significant levels due to the cumulative effect of cables and RFI suppression components. Limits on protective conductor currents are no longer set by the electricity supply regulations (Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 2002) and BS 7671 does not set maximum limits for installations. Protective conductor currents and capacitance to earth limits set by British Standards are large enough to allow a build-up of protective conductor currents among appliances, luminaires and RFI suppression components to a level that may trip an RCD.

With the arrival of the EMC Directive, this lack of control has resulted in an increase in the use of the protective conductor for functional purposes since electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), and not the provision of additional protection by RCDs, is the priority of equipment manufacturers. The objectives of good RFI suppression and of earth fault protection create a conflict of interests, which has yet to be resolved.

Residual current devices from BEAMA *Installation* manufacturers are fitted with over-voltage transient protection and other features to overcome many of these problems.

10.1 Fire Protection - Extract from DTI Report

The following information is reproduced with their kind permission, from the Department of Trade and Industry Report *Residual current devices; added value for home safety*. It forms the basis for the information in Chapter 4 and underlines the role of RCDs in fire prevention.

Note: Section headings have been re-numbered to follow the sequence in this Guide.

10.1.1 The Incidence of Fires in Household Electrical Appliances

Table I gives details of the average annual number of fires to which fire brigades are called and which have been identified as associated with faults in electrical appliances (Ref. I). The Table is ordered with the appliance type giving the higher incidence of fires listed higher in the Table.

Product safety standards seek to minimize the risk of fire ignition and to ensure that if fire ignition does occur then the fire is contained. In practice, these provisions for fire safety are supplemented by over-current and sometimes earth leakage protection devices in the supply installation.

For Class II appliances under normal conditions, no earth fault current path will be involved and no added protection against fire would be expected if an RCD was used.

For Class I appliances, RCDs would be expected to provide closer protection and limit the duration of current flow and energy transfer to insulation in the event of fault currents to earth and thereby reduce risk of fire ignition. In the list of appliances shown in Table I of this Annex, Class I appliances predominate.

Table I
Average annual number of fires in domestic premises in the UK attended by fire brigades where the fires are attributed to faults in electrical appliances, lighting or wiring.

Appliance Type	Average incidence of fires attended by the fire brigades attributed to faults in appliances	Probable Construction Class	
Washing machines	1747.00	I	
Blankets, bedwarmers	640.00		II
Other	477.00		
Electric cooking appliances	445.00	I	
TV	368.00		II
Dishwashers	320.00	I	
Tumble/Spin drier	305.00	I	
Electric water heating	263.00	I	
Refrigerators	253.00	I	
Electric space heating	234.00	I	
Lighting	183.00	I	II
Central heating	76.00	I	
Other wiring	52.00		
Irons	16.00	I	
Plugs, socket switch	16.00		

10.1.2 Electrically Induced Fire Ignition and Propagation

Fires in electrical wiring systems and electrical equipment are usually the result of arcing or overheating associated with current carrying conductors. Electrical appliances and supply systems contain considerable amounts of plastic materials. When electrical conductors are subject to arcing or overheating and are adjacent to insulation the chemical processes of combustion can occur as follows:

- An initial heating of the insulation - the resulting temperature increase will be rate dependent on the amount of heat generated, the specific heat of the product mass, the thermal conductivity of the material and the latent heats of fusion and vaporisation where these procedures occur.
- Degradation and decomposition of the material.
- Flame ignition - this depends on the availability of oxygen, the flash points of the materials and their limits of flammability.

Product safety standards will generally require low flammability materials to be used where insulation is touching or supporting electrically live parts. However, even low flammability fire resistant plastics can support combustion if a high temperature is maintained for a sufficient length of time. Materials classified as low flammability may also support a local flame for a short time. To avoid flame spread, it is important that designs allow adequate separation between these materials and other high flammability materials which may be present. Flame propagation sometimes occurs as a result of distortion or melting of plastic parts which allows them to come into contact with, or to drop onto, a heat source.

10.1.3 RCD Protection against Fire Induced by Surface Tracking across Insulation

Surface tracking is a common cause of insulation failure. It arises from the growth of conducting paths at the surface. These may be due to conducting deposits from the atmosphere and the presence of moisture. When the path carries enough current, it will become thermally unstable resulting in a permanently conducting state. The action is progressive and ultimately a conducting path will bridge the insulation.

Surface tracking can occur at voltage levels well below the intrinsic breakdown strength of the dielectric. An established track between two conductors can produce local temperatures sufficient to ignite flammable vapour released from the insulation by the heating produced in the track or adjacent materials.

The rate of growth of tracks in practice is slow until a conducting path has been established. A standard test has been developed to compare the resistance to surface tracking of different materials in a short time span. The test is detailed in IEC specification 60112 (See Section 10.1.6).

In the tracking test, if a current of 500mA or more flows for at least two seconds in a conducting path between the electrodes on the surface of the specimen or if the specimen burns, the material has failed the test.

Although the test is designed to be used only for comparative purposes, it is clear that if the final results of the test are representative of the long term effects of normal levels of pollution on the tracking resistance of materials, and the spacing between the test electrodes is representative, then an RCD with a trip current of 500mA would provide

suitable protection against fire for materials which pass the test. RCD protection would only be effective for tracking paths to earth and not for tracking paths between phase and neutral supply conductors.

10.1.4 Surface Tracking Induced by Fluid Contamination of Insulation

The tracking test is designed to simulate the long term effects of surface contamination and moisture on the tracking resistance of insulation. However, the test can also provide an insight into the effect of fluid contamination on insulation and the ability of RCDs to halt or prevent tracking.

A diagram of the tracking test configuration is shown in Section 10.1.6.

During a standard tracking test it can be established that the liquid conductivity in the first phase gives a current of the order 2-5mA. In the second phase, surface discharge activity occurs at current levels of the order 2-5mA. When discharge activity ceases, the current is of the order of 2mA. When the liquid is present, the current flow would be sufficient to trip a 30mA or 100mA RCD. In the period where surface discharge activity occurs prior to a low resistance tracking path being established, an RCD would not be expected to act to completely eliminate deterioration of the surface and the formation of incipient tracks.

Further tests have been made to determine the current levels needed to cause flame ignition by tracking. A sample of printed circuit board having a good resistance to tracking was used for these tests. Using a standard tracking test solution, a track across the insulation between adjacent conductors developed at a current of 80mA. As the current increased to 90mA, the track glowed red and a yellow flame ignited along the track. The flame height was approximately 8mm. The current levels observed in this experiment indicate that a 30mA RCD would have interrupted this process before flame ignition. In a second similar experiment with a 30mA RCD in circuit, it was not possible to develop a track between the conductors or to cause flame ignition.

Some household detergent fluids have a high conductivity compared with the standard test fluid used in the tracking test. Tests were carried out using one common fluid which has a conductivity of approximately five times that of the standard tracking test fluid. Using a liquid having a higher conductivity would be expected to accelerate the onset of tracking failure.

The current levels measured in these tests were in the range 8-84mA. It was observed that the nature of the solution appeared to play a more dominant role in the failure process in these tests than when the standard test solution was used. During the tests, a pink coloured flame 2mm high was observed, apparently associated with decomposition of the fluid.

It is clear from the tests carried out, that if contamination by conductive fluid bridges insulation between a supply conductor and earth, and produces a high conductivity path, then this is likely to trip an RCD having a sufficiently low trip current level. However, if the resistance of the fluid is such that heating will cause evaporation at current levels below the threshold for RCD operation, then tracks can form.

The above tests suggest that RCDs can be sensitive enough to trip due to the presence of conductive fluid contamination, spillage or spray in appliances as a result of earth current flow and may arrest the progress of tracking before flame ignition occurs. If appliances may be subject to fluid contamination of insulation, for example due to deterioration of seals in appliances or spillage, RCDs can provide protection at current levels where over-current protection would not be expected to operate.

10.1.5 Electrical Equipment Faults and Fire Hazard Limitation

In this section, consideration will be given to the role which RCDs and over-current protection devices can play in reducing the risk of fire associated with potential faults in home electrical wiring systems and components common to different types of electrical household appliances.

10.1.5.1 Wiring Installations and Equipment

The major fire risks in fixed installations are overheating of connections and arcing at switch contacts or connections. Modern PVC insulated wiring, if properly installed, can be expected to outlast the lifetime of the property. The wiring must be protected against short circuit or sustained over-current by the use of fuses or over-current circuit breakers. Also, the current rating of the circuit must not be exceeded in the event that the circuit is later extended.

In the event of overheating of connections, neither over-current devices nor RCDs would protect against fire ignition unless a secondary event occurred such as contact with another conductor which might produce a high over-current, or contact with an earthed conductor.

Surface tracking may occur in wiring installation accessories such as distribution boxes, switches and socket outlets due to environmental pollution and moisture. Condensation is likely to occur particularly in areas such as cellars and where wiring is routed into buildings. An established track can produce a localised temperature increase sufficient to ignite flammable vapour released from the insulation as a result of heating produced in the track. Whereas an RCD should provide some protection against tracking between the phase or neutral conductors and earth, no protection would be provided against a phase to neutral track. Over-current devices would not provide protection against fire ignition by surface tracking.

RCD protection would also operate in respect of earth leakage currents due to damaged insulation on wiring conductors in metal conduit and at entry points in metal wall boxes.

10.1.5.2 Motors

The principal causes of fire ignition in motors are arcs or sparks igniting insulation or nearby flammable material. Such events can occur when the motor winding short circuits or grounds or when the brushes operate improperly. Overheating can occur when the ventilation is restricted or the motor is stalled. Bearings may overheat because of improper lubrication. Sometimes excessive wear on bearings allows the rotor to rub on the stator. The individual drives of appliances of many types sometimes make it necessary to install motors in locations and under conditions which are injurious to motor insulation. Dust that can conduct electrically such as brush material may be deposited on the insulation, or deposits of textile fibres may prevent normal operation and obstruct cooling vents.

Motors may be provided with over-current protection to limit overheating should the motor stall or fail to start. In addition, an over-temperature cut-out may be provided. RCDs can provide added protection in respect of fault currents to earth when basic insulation between the windings and an earthed housing becomes contaminated by dust, cracks or fails due to, for example, thermal stress or mechanical stress or ageing.

10.1.5.3 Transformers

The primary cause of fire with transformers is overheating of conductors and insulation. Fusing is provided to prevent overheating under overload fault conditions and may be supplemented by over-temperature cut-outs.

In many applications, parts of the transformer may be connected to earth and, in the event of a failure to earth, an RCD can provide protection by limiting the current flow and the consequent heating effect.

10.1.5.4 Switch and Relay Contacts

Failures of contacts may occur due to weak springs, contact-arcing, spark erosion and plating wear. Failures due to contamination can also occur. Surface deposits, particularly carbon or ferrous particles, cause electrical failures and insulation breakdown. High resistance contacts often due to the deposition of non-conducting or semi-conducting material at the contact surfaces will cause local overheating which may result in fire. These faults will not be detected by over-current or RCD protection devices.

Where contamination or tracking across insulation provides a conductive path to earth, RCDs can offer added protection.

Vibration will accelerate mechanical deterioration of contacts and other moving components.

10.1.5.5 Internal Wiring and Connections

There are two types of faults in electrical wiring. These are open circuit faults, where a conductor has parted, and short circuit faults where a conducting path exists between one conductor and another conductor or earth. A fault can be a combination of both an open circuit fault in a conductor and a short circuit fault.

Open circuit faults, such as poor wiring connections due to contact ageing, are an important cause of local overheating and are unlikely to be detected by RCDs or over-current protection devices. Arcing which results from conductor failure in a flexible cord, although potentially a fire hazard, will not be detected by RCDs or over-current protection devices unless a short circuit fault exists at the same time due to, for example, the broken end of the conductor piercing the insulation.

Connections will be sensitive to factors such as load cycling, the initial integrity of the contact interface, vibration, mechanical disturbance, the effect of environmental contamination and growth of tarnish films at the contact interface. Where connections are made to components, surface tracking may occur as a result of conductive surface deposits and moisture. Under these circumstances where the tracking is to an earthed surface, protection may be provided by an RCD.

10.1.5.6 Heating Elements

Heating elements may have an earthed sheath. RCDs will provide early warning of breakdown of insulation and will also detect pin holes in sheathing when used to heat water.

10.1.5.7 Summary

From the above considerations it is clear that although RCDs and over-current devices have a role in reducing the risk of fire in electrical equipment, they will not respond to many of the failure modes likely to initiate fire ignition. Particular problems arise in detecting overheating of connections and in-line wiring faults which are a common cause of fires. The role RCDs can play in providing added protection is illustrated by Table 2 of this Annex..


Item	Potential Faults	RCD Added Protection	Over-current Protection	Over-temperature Cut-out
Motors	Surface contamination of insulation: Carbon Tracking.	RCD's will trip at low values of earth leakage current due to: tracking or contamination; cracks or faults in insulation caused by thermo-mechanical stress or mechanical damage; arcs or sparks when the motor winding short-circuits or grounds or when brushes operate improperly.	Will respond to overheating if the motor fails to start, provided the operating current is set close with running current.	Will respond to overheating caused by lack of ventilation or conductor overheating while running.
Transformers	Surface contamination of insulation: Overheating.	Where there is a failure of insulation between the primary winding and earth, RCD protection will operate.	Fusing is usually provided to prevent overheating under fault conditions.	Over-temperature cut-outs may be fitted.
Switch and Relay Contacts & Controls	The rating and performance characteristics are not suited to the duty-cycle. Tracking or contamination.	RCD's can provide protection where tracking or contamination provides a conductive path to earth.	Needed for L-N fault protection.	
Heating Elements	Pin holes in metal sheathing of mineral insulated elements allowing moisture to penetrate.	RCD's will provide an early indication of breakdown of insulation. Note. Certain elements may not be sealed by design and at switch on, significant levels of earth leakage current can occur due to moisture ingress (see section 5).	Needed to protect against L-N insulation failure.	
Wiring	Open circuit faults on flexible cords. Short circuit due to insulation damage.	RCD's will detect any loose wires which contact an earthed surface. They will also detect insulation damage in metal conduct.	Required to prevent overheating in the event of a fault, insulation damage and L-N failure.	
Connections	Vibration loosening. Mechanical disturbance: Deterioration of contact interfaces and overheating: Connections not dimensioned in respect of their heating.	RCD's will detect connections loosened by, for example, vibration which come free and touch earthed surfaces.	Will protect against high current L-N or L-E contact if the connection becomes free.	
Wiring Accessories	May be subject to condensation in humid areas which are subject to wide temperature fluctuations. Contacts can overheat, due to vibration, poor insulation or surface oxidation.	RCD's will respond to condensation leading to liquid build up in enclosures and tracking across insulation.		
Electronic Circuits	Contamination		Local protection in the form of fusing is appropriate.	May be appropriate for some components.

Table 2
Potential fault conditions for Circuit Protection Devices and Electrical Components

10.1.6 The Comparative Tracking Index Test (IEC Specification 60112)

The diagram right shows the tracking test configuration. The tracking test operates as follows:

- a) A standard contaminant liquid having a conductivity of 2.4 siemens is fed as a single drop to fall between the two electrodes which are set to a test voltage, e.g. 250V is common at the present time. In earlier years 125V or 175V were often specified.
- b) The heat developed by the passage of current through the liquid evaporates the liquid and heats the specimen.
- c) In the final stages of evaporation, discharges can be observed on the surface of the insulation which are known as scintillations and these create sites which develop into a tracking path. Different materials will require a different number of drops of the test solution or a different test voltage to produce tracking sufficient to form a sustained conduction path between the electrodes.



The test is continued to 50 drops of the test solution. A failure has occurred if a current of 500mA or more flows for at least 2s in a conducting path between the electrodes on the surface of the specimen, thus operating an over-current relay; or if the specimen burns without releasing the relay.

10.1.7 Practical Tests on Surface Tracking Induced by Fluid Contamination of Insulation and RCD Protection

10.1.7.1 Background

Using standard tracking test equipment the liquid conductivity in the first phase gives a current between the electrodes of the order of 100mA. In the second phase, surface discharge activity is associated with currents of the order 2-5mA. When discharge activity ceases, the current is of the order of 2mA. Clearly, when the liquid is present the current would be sufficient to trip a 30mA RCD. However, during the discharge period before the establishment of a low resistance tracking path, an RCD would be insensitive to the level of current needed to prevent deterioration of the surface of the insulation.

10.1.7.2 Tracking Tests

Further tests at ERA have been made to assess the effects of contamination of insulation by conducting fluids and the effectiveness of RCD protection in preventing fire ignition by tracking.

Standard Test Solution

A 0.01 ml drop of the standard tracking test solution was applied to the insulation between two conductors on a printed circuit board (gap 3mm) and a voltage applied between the conductors. When the voltage applied was 80V, bubbles were seen to form at the electrode interface with the fluid. The measured current was 4.2mA. At 10V the liquid evaporated.

In a second test at 250V, the phenomena observed were similar to those in a conventional tracking test rig. Scintillations were observed as the liquid evaporated and eventually a track formed which extended approximately halfway across the insulation. The current measured was 37mA.

A second drop was applied at the same position on the insulation. Further tracks formed and the current level increased to 65mA. On the fourth drop, the current increased to 80mA and a track was formed between the conductors. As the current increased to 90mA, the track glowed red and a yellow flame ignited along the length of the track. The flame height was approximately 8mm. The current observed in this experiment allows the inference that an RCD with a trip current of 30mA would have interrupted the process before flame ignition occurred. An RCD with a trip current of 300 or 500mA would not have been effective.

In a second similar experiment with a 32mA RCD in circuit, tracks were formed but it was not possible to ignite the material. Nine attempts were made. A factor in this experiment was that only a small quantity of liquid could be applied between the conductors to avoid causing the RCD to trip.

Household Liquid Solution

Some detergent fluids have a high conductivity compared with the standard test fluid used in the tracking test. A test was carried out using one common fluid which has a conductivity of approximately 5 times that of the standard tracking test fluid.

A drop of solution was applied to the insulation between two conductors of the printed circuit board (gap 3mm) and a voltage applied between the tracks. When the voltage applied was 40V, bubbles were seen to form at the electrode interface with the fluid. The current measured was 8mA. Within a time of the order of seconds, the bubbles spread to form a central path between the printed circuit board conductors.

In a second test at 250V, the phenomena observed were similar to those in a conventional tracking test rig with scintillations occurring as the liquid evaporated and eventually a track between the conductors was established. The order of current observed during the test were 8-84mA. Following complete evaporation of the liquid and the cessation of discharge activity, the resistance between the printed circuit board conductors was measured as greater than 400MΩ. During the test, a pink coloured flame 2mm high was observed apparently associated with decomposition of the fluid. The currents involved in this experiment suggest that RCD operation would have interrupted the process. However, the dominant cause of the high conductivity was the presence of the fluid or its effect in maintaining a continuous conductive path along the track. Examination of the specimen after the test suggested that the fluid played a dominant role in the failure process rather than the intrinsic properties of the printed circuit board insulation.

A third test was made to establish the progress of events with a 30mA RCD in circuit. In the presence of a drop of the fluid across the insulation, the RCD tripped due to the high conductivity of the fluid. With less liquid present, scintillations occurred and the RCD did not trip. Following a second application of the liquid, tracking developed across the insulation. A period followed in which the track glowed red then the RCD tripped to halt the process.

It is clear from the tests that if contamination by conductive fluid can bridge insulation to earth and produce a low conductivity path, this is likely to trip an RCD. However, where the film resistance is such that heating will cause evaporation, tracks will form below the threshold for RCD operation. RCDs will provide no protection against tracking or fire ignition when live to neutral insulation is bridged unless there is an associated path to earth.

The above test shows that high sensitivity RCDs will trip when the presence of conductive fluid contamination spillage or spray in appliances results in earth current flow. In such cases, the RCD may arrest the progress of tracking before flame ignition of insulation occurs. Although only a limited amount of testing has been carried out in the present work, it is clear that RCDs have the potential to reduce the incidence of fire due to surface tracking.

Ref. 1. Fire Statistics United Kingdom 1993

Home Office Statistics Division 3, September 1995 (and other editions)

10.2 Capacitance and Inductance in Overhead Lines and Cables

The following calculations relate to section 9.4. Cables and overhead lines

Capacitance

The capacitance of a concentric cable is given by :

$$C = \frac{2\pi E}{\ln \frac{b}{a}}$$

where b = Sheath Diameter

a = Core Diameter

E = Permittivity of free space

If we consider a standard domestic mains cable then:

$$b = 6 \text{ mm}$$

$$a = 3 \text{ mm}$$

$$C = \frac{2\pi \times 8.85 \times 10^{-12}}{\ln \frac{6}{3}} = 80 \text{ pF/m}$$

The capacitance of a twin conductor line above an earthed plane is given by:

$$C = \frac{\pi E}{\ln \left[\frac{2x \sqrt{h_1 h_2}}{a \sqrt{x^2 + 4h_1 h_2}} \right]}$$

x = Line spacing (Distance apart)

a = Radius of the line conductor

h_1 and h_2 = Heights of lines above earth.

In general, both lines will be the same height above earth.

$$h_1 = h_2 = h$$

$$C = \frac{\pi E}{\ln \frac{2xh}{a \sqrt{x^2 + 4h^2}}}$$

In the case where both lines are clipped to an earthed surface.

x = 500 mm, say, or a maximum value

a = 1.5 mm

h = 3 mm

$$C = \frac{\pi(8.85 \times 10^{-12})}{\ln \left[\frac{2 \times 500 \times 3 \times 10^{-6}}{(1.5 \times 10^{-3}) \sqrt{(500 \times 10^{-3})^2 + 4(3 \times 10^{-3})^2}} \right]} = 20 \text{ pF/m}$$

If the height above earth is much greater than the spacing between the lines, the capacitance due to the earth plane is negligible compared with that between the lines. This is the condition with pole-mounted overhead lines.

$$h_1 = h_2 : x^2 \ll 4h_1 h_2$$

Therefore,
$$C = \frac{\pi E}{\ln \frac{x}{a}}$$

If x = 500 mm and a = 1.5 mm as before.

$$C = \frac{\pi(8.85 \times 10^{-12})}{\ln \frac{500}{1.5}} = 4.8 \text{ pF/m}$$

The capacitances of an isolated three-phase line are represented by:

$$C = \frac{2\pi E}{\ln \left[\frac{D_{ab} D_{bc}}{a D_{ac}} \right]}$$

Where D_{ab} , D_{bc} and D_{ac} are the three line spacings.

Since wire radius and spacing have only a small effect on this capacitance then:

$$C = \frac{2\pi E}{\ln \frac{D}{a}}$$

which is almost the same as that for an isolated twin conductor line.

Inductance

The inductance of these two types of conductor:

For a concentric cable, inductance per metre is:

$$L = \frac{\mu_i}{8\pi} + \frac{\mu_d}{2\pi} \ln \frac{b}{a} + \frac{\mu_s}{2\pi} \left[\frac{f^4 \ln \frac{f}{b}}{(f^2 - b^2)^2} - \frac{f^2}{(f^2 - b^2)} + \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{f^2 + b^2}{f^2 - b^2} \right) \right]$$

Where

a = Core Diameter

b = Sheath Inner Radius

f = Sheath Outer Radius

μ_i = Core Permeability = μ_o

μ_d = Dielectric Permeability = μ_o

μ_s = Sheath Permeability

μ_o = Permeability of Free Space

If a = 3 mm; b = 4mm; f = 6mm then:

$$L = \frac{4\pi \times 10^{-7}}{8\pi} + \frac{4\pi \times 10^{-7}}{2\pi} \ln \frac{4}{3} + \frac{\mu_s}{2\pi} \left[\frac{(6 \times 10^{-3})^4 \ln \frac{6}{4}}{((6 \times 10^{-3})^2 - (4 \times 10^{-3})^2)^2} - \frac{(6 \times 10^{-3})^2}{(6 \times 10^{-3})^2 - (4 \times 10^{-3})^2} + \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{(6 \times 10^{-3})^2 + (4 \times 10^{-3})^2}{(6 \times 10^{-3})^2 - (4 \times 10^{-3})^2} \right) \right]$$

Therefore, $L = 1.075 \times 10^{-7} + \frac{\mu_s}{2\pi} + 0.16375$

For a steel-armoured cable:

$$\mu_s = 4\pi \times 10^{-7} \times 1000$$

Therefore, $L = 33\mu H / \text{metre}$

For a non-ferrous sheath material:

$$\mu_s = 4\pi \times 10^{-7}$$

Therefore, $L = 0.14\mu H / \text{metre}$

The inductance per metre of a twin conductor line above an earthed plane is:

$$L = \frac{\mu_o}{2\pi} \left(\ln \frac{d}{a} - \ln \frac{\sqrt{4b^2 + d^2}}{2b} \right)$$

where

a = Conductor Radius

b = Conductor Height above earth

d = Distance between conductors

The presence of the earth plane reduces the self-inductance of the circuit.

When $b \gg d$ this becomes:

$$L = \frac{\mu_o}{\pi} \ln \frac{d}{a}$$

If a = 1.5 mm and d = 500 mm

$$L = \frac{4\pi \times 10^{-7}}{\pi} \ln \frac{500}{1.5} = 2.3\mu H / \text{metre}$$

The presence of a steel core within each conductor does not appreciably affect the result.

The inductance of an isolated three-phase line is given by:

$$L = \frac{\mu}{2\pi} \ln \frac{\sqrt[3]{(d_{AB} \times d_{BC} \times d_{AC})}}{a}$$

where d_{AB} , d_{BC} , d_{AC} are the distances between the three lines and μ is Permeability.

If these distances are equal, then:

$$L = \frac{\mu}{2\pi} \ln \frac{d}{a}$$

which again is almost the same as that for an isolated twin conductor line.

The above analysis shows that:

- The inductance and capacitance of a steel-armoured cable is significantly greater than that of an equivalent overhead line.
- The inductance of a steel-armoured cable is significantly greater than that of an equivalent non-armoured cable.
- The capacitance of a non-armoured cable is significantly greater than that of an equivalent overhead line.
- The inductance of an overhead line is greater than that of an equivalent non-armoured cable

10.3.1 Documents to which reference is made in the Handbook

BS 7671 Requirements for Electrical Installations. IEE Wiring Regulations 16th Edition

IEC 60479 Effects of electric current on human beings and livestock

BS EN 61008: Specification for residual current operated circuit breakers without integral overcurrent protection for household and similar uses (RCCBs).

BS EN 61009: Specification for residual current operated circuit breakers with integral overcurrent protection for household and similar uses (RCBOs)

DTI Publication: Residual current devices; added value for home safety

BS EN 55011: Limits and methods of measurement of radio disturbance characteristics of industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio-frequency equipment

BS EN 55013: Limits and methods of measurement of radio disturbance characteristics of broadcast receivers and associated equipment

BS EN 60065: Specification for safety requirements for mains-operated electronic and related apparatus for household and similar general use

BS EN 60335-1: Specification for safety of household and similar electrical appliances. General requirements

BS EN 60335-2-90: Specification for safety of household and similar electrical appliances. Particular requirements. Commercial microwave ovens

BS EN 60598: Luminaires

BS EN 60947: Specification for low-voltage switchgear and controlgear

BS 613: Specification for components and filter units for electromagnetic interference suppression

BS 1650: Capacitors for Power-Frequency Systems

BS 4293: Specification for residual current-operated circuit-breakers (Superseded by BS EN 61008-1 See above)

BS 4533: Luminaires

IEC60112: Method for determining the comparative and the proof tracking indices of solid insulating materials under moist conditions

IEC 61140: Protection against electric shock – Common aspects for installations and equipment

Electricity Supply Regulations 1988. Replaced by:

Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 2002

Fire Statistics United Kingdom

10.3.2 Other relevant documents not specifically mentioned in the text

IEE Guidance Notes

Health and Safety Booklet HSR25: Memorandum of Guidance on the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989

IEC Guide 105: Principles concerning the safety of equipment electrically connected to a telecommunications network.

10.3.3 Associated directives and statutory regulations

Electricity at Work Regulations 01 April 1990

Health and Safety at Work Act 1994

Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (PUWER)

European Directives

- CE Marking
- Construction (Design Management) Regulations
- Construction Products (CPD)
- Consumer Protection
- Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
- Explosive Atmospheres (ATEX)
- General Product Safety
- Low Voltage (LVD)
- Machinery (MD)
- Telephone Termination Equipment (TTE)

10.4 Terms and Definitions

Circuit-Breaker

A switching device capable of making, carrying and breaking normal load currents and also making and automatically breaking abnormal currents, such as short-circuit currents, under pre-determined conditions. The terms miniature circuit-breaker (MCB) and moulded-case circuit-breaker (MCCB) are no longer recognised.

Residual Current

Algebraic sum of the instantaneous values of the current flowing in the main circuit of an RCD (expressed as r.m.s. value).

RCD - Residual Current Device

A switching device incorporating the means of detection of a residual current, of comparison of its value to the residual current operating value and of opening the protected circuit when the residual current exceeds this value.

Note: See Section 1.3 for definitions of different types of residual current device.

EFR - Earth Fault Relay

A device incorporating the means of detection of an earth fault current, of comparison of its value to the earth fault current operating value and of giving a signal to an associated switching device to open the protected circuit when the earth fault current exceeds this value. Relays can be directly connected or fed from a separate toroid.

Note. Although not necessarily an RCD, this type of device is used in conjunction with other devices to provide protection of the total installation against the effects of high earth fault currents.

CU - Consumer Unit

(may also be known as a consumer control unit or electricity control unit).

A particular type of distribution board comprising a co-ordinated assembly for the control and distribution of electrical energy, principally in domestic premises. It will normally incorporate manual means of double pole isolation on the incoming circuit and an assembly of one or more fuses, miniature circuit-breakers, residual current operated devices, signalling and/or other control devices.

DB - Distribution Board

An assembly containing switching or protective devices (e.g. fuses, circuit breakers, residual current operated devices) associated with one or more outgoing circuits fed from one or more incoming circuits together with terminals for the neutral and protective circuit conductors. It may also include signalling and/or control devices. Means of isolation may be included in the board or may be provided separately.

PB - Panelboard

An assembly containing switching or protective devices (e.g. circuit breakers or fusegear typically in accordance with BS EN 60947-2 and/or BS EN 60947-3) associated with one or

more outgoing circuits fed from one or more incoming circuits together with terminals for the neutral and protective circuit conductors. It may also include residual current protection systems, signalling and/or control devices. Means of isolation may be included in the board or may be provided separately.

Switchboard

An assembly containing switchgear, short-circuit/overcurrent protection devices, instrumentation, signalling or other control devices. The term however, does not apply to groups of local switches in final circuits.

Class I Equipment

Equipment in which protection against electric shock does not rely on basic insulation only, but which includes means for the connection of exposed-conductive-parts to a protective conductor in the fixed wiring of the installation. (BS:7671).

Class II Equipment

Equipment in which protection against electric shock does not rely on basic insulation only, but in which additional safety precautions such as supplementary insulation are provided, there being no provision for the connection of exposed metalwork of the equipment to a protective conductor, and no reliance upon precautions to be taken in the fixed wiring of the installation. (BS:7671)

